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Abstract— We study a fingerprinting game in which the collu-
sion channel is unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into
a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to
trace back pirated copies to the colluders.
Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit
value of a sequence of maxmin games with mutual information as
the payoff function. However, these games generally do not admit
saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically.
Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we
reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-
sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution.
If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprint alphabet
is binary, we derive equations that can numerically solve the
capacity game for arbitrary k. We also provide tight upper and
lower bounds on the capacity. Finally, we discuss the asymptotic
behavior of the fingerprinting game for large k and practical
implementation issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fingerprinting is a technique for copyright protection. It was
first proposed by Wagner in 1983 [1] and has drawn a lot
of attention in recent years. The content distributor embeds
a unique mark, or fingerprint, within each licensed copy. By
forming a group of users (pirates), the coalition can detect
the fingerprints by inspecting the marks in each copy, and
create a forgery that has only weak traces of their copies. A
collusion-resistant fingerprinting system is designed to combat
the collusive attacks.
Boneh and Shaw in [2] proposed the marking assumption
for the fingerprinting problem. In this setup, fingerprints are
a string of marks allocated throughout the host content. The
locations of the marks are assumed unknown to the pirates. By
comparing their available copies, the coalition can remove or
replace the detected marks, but cannot modify those marks at
which their copies agree. As a result, we can ignore the host
sequence and consider only the fingerprints in our analysis.
Tardos in 2003 [3] invented a simple but efficient ran-
domized fingerprinting code that invites many subsequent
works, such as [4], [5]. Amiri and Tardos recently [6] (and
independently of our work) further improved the rate by
constructing a code based on a two-person zero-sum game.
Although the code is far more efficient than the previous
scheme, the intense computational complexity makes it less
appealing for practical use.
A few researchers have also studied the problem from the
information-theoretic point of view [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
Here we focus on finding the maximum achievable rate, or
capacity, of the fingerprinting system. Recently, Moulin in [9]
provided the capacity formula in a general setup. We study
specifically the marking assumption in this paper and show
that the capacity is indeed the rate achieved in [6].
One concern is that neither the encoder nor the decoder
knows the actual coalition size in real applications [11]. We
show that this is actually not a big issue. The saddle-point
property states that for a fingerprinting code designed for a
maximal coalition size k, there exists a unique saddle-point
solution that achieves the capacity. That is, neither the content
distributor nor the coalition can gain by deviating from its
optimal strategy. As a result, the system is secure for any
collusive attack of size no more than k. Furthermore, even if
the size-k anticipation is violated, no innocent user is accused
[9]. The pirates are simply too powerful and we have not
enough evidence to accuse them. Instead, the decoder gives
us the more probable suspects which may allow the legal
authority to do further investigation.
In this paper, we reformulate the capacity formula in [9] as
the value of a single two-person zero-sum game and show that
it admits a saddle-point solution. In the binary alphabet case,
new capacity bounds are provided. The proofs not only show
that the binary fingerprinting capacity is in Θ(1/k2), but they
also provide secure strategies for both players of the game.
Along with the numerical saddle-point solutions for small k,
we study the asymptotic behavior of the game for large k.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section II,
we formally define fingerprinting capacity and review the
capacity formula derived in [9]. The derivation of the single
fingerprinting capacity game is shown in Section III, and
Section IV is devoted to the binary alphabet case.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
We use capital letters to represent random variables, and
lowercase letters to their realizations. Boldfaces denote vec-
tors, and calligraphic letters denote sets. For example, X ∈ Xn
denotes a random vector (X1, . . . , Xn), with each Xi taking
values in X . The probability distribution of X is denoted by
pX. The entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X).
The mutual information of X and Y , with joint pmf p is
denoted by Ip(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ). We also denote the
binary entropy function by h2(p) , −p log p− (1−p) log(1−
p) and h2(p) = (h2(p1), . . . , h2(pn))′. The KL divergence
between two Bernoulli random variables with expectations p
and q is denoted by d2(p‖q) , p log pq + (1− p) log 1−p1−q . log
denotes base 2 logarithm and ln denotes natural logarithm.
Mathematical expectation is denoted by the symbol E. The
shorthands f ∼ g and f & g denote asymptotic relations
limk→∞
f(k)
g(k) = 1 and lim infk→∞
f(k)
g(k) ≥ 1 respectively.
B. Overview
Let Q = {0, 1, . . . , q−1} denote a size-q fingerprint alpha-
bet, and M = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of user indices. The
fingerprint encoder assigns each user a length-n fingerprint,
using an encoding function
fn :M×Wn → Qn, (1)
where the secret key Wn ∈ Wn is a random variable whose
realization is known to the encoder and the decoder, but
unknown to the pirates.
A coalition K is any size-k subset of M, and XK =
{X1, . . . ,Xk} are the fingerprints available to the coalition.
The collusion channel produces the forgery Y ∈ Qn according
to distribution pY|XK . The marking assumption states that if
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, x1,j = · · · = xk,j , then yj = x1,j .
Not knowing the actual collusion channel pY|XK , the single-
output decoder
gn : Qn ×Wn →M (2)
accuses exactly one user based on the forgery Y and the
secret key Wn. The encoding and decoding functions fn and
gn are deterministic, but a fingerprinting code is a random
variable (Fn, Gn) whose distribution is characterized by that
of Wn. Under fingerprinting code (Fn, Gn), the worst-case
error probability is defined as
P ∗e (Fn, Gn, k) = max
K⊆M
|K|≤k
max
pY|XK
Pr (Gn(Y,Wn) /∈ K) , (3)
where the second maximization is over all pY|XK satisfying
the marking assumption.
C. Fingerprinting Capacity
We now define fingerprinting capacity and review the ca-
pacity formula [9] under the marking assumption. Capacity is
achieved using a random coding scheme.
Definition 2.1: A rate R is achievable for the q-ary alphabet
and size-k coalitions if there exists a sequence of fingerprinting
codes (Fn, Gn) for m = ⌈2nR⌉ users such that
lim
n→∞
P ∗e (Fn, Gn, k) = 0. (4)
Definition 2.2: Fingerprinting capacity Ck,q is the supre-
mum of all achievable rates for the q-ary alphabet and size-k
coalitions.
Now for a random variable W defined over an alphabet
W = {1, 2, . . . , l}, we define the embedding class
P
l
XKW
=
{
pXKW (xK, w) = pW (w)
k∏
i=1
pX|W (xi|w)
}
,
(5)
the collusion class
PY |XK = {pY |XK : pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀pi;
pY |XK(y|xK) = 1 if y = x1 = · · · = xk}, (6)
where pi : K → K is a permutation of the coalition K, and the
function
Clk,q =
1
k
max
pXKW∈P
l
XKW
min
pY |XK∈PY |XK
I(XK;Y |W ). (7)
Theorem 2.3: [9, Theorem 3.4] The fingerprinting capacity
Ck,q for the q-ary alphabet and size-k coalitions is
Ck,q = lim
l→∞
Clk,q . (8)
Fingerprinting capacity is the limit value of a sequence of
maxmin games. For any fixed l, Clk,q is the maxmin value
of a two-person zero-sum game with the content distributor
as the maximizer and the coalition as the minimizer. In the
achievability proof, W is a time-sharing random variable. As
l increases, it gives the content distributor more flexibility in
choosing the codes. Hence the sequence Clk,q , 1 ≤ l ≤ ∞, is
nondecreasing and admits a finite limit.
However, it is not an easy task to evaluate Clk,q as well
as the capacity-achieving probability distributions, even for
small values of l. The reason is that a saddle-point solution is
generally not guaranteed. For the binary alphabet (q = 2) and
l = 1, we can derive that
C1k,2 =
1
k
2−(k−1),
which is not achieved by a saddle-point solution when k > 2.
Also, this is very loose lower bound for Ck,2 comparing to
the Θ(k−2) bound we will show in Sec. IV-C.
III. THE TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAME OF
FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY
To establish the desired saddle-point property, we first
reformulate the fingerprinting capacity as the value of a single
maxmin game. Consider an auxiliary random vector W drawn
from the q-dimensional probability simplex
W
q ,
{
w ∈ Rq :
q−1∑
x=0
wx = 1 and 0 ≤ wx ≤ 1, x ∈ Q
}
(9)
and the class of joint distributions
PXKW = {pXKW(xK,w) = pW(w)
k∏
i=1
pX|W(xi|w),
where pX|W(x|w) = wx, x ∈ Q}. (10)
Then we can express Ck,q as in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1:
Ck,q =
1
k
max
pXKW∈PXKW
min
pY |XK∈PY |XK
I(XK;Y |W). (11)
Proof: Note that the class PXKW is compact and
the payoff function is bounded, hence the maximizer exists.
Denote the right-hand side of (11) by C′k,q . We can show that
C′k,q ≥ Ck,q and C′k,q ≤ Ck,q respectively. For lack of space
we skip the complete proof but give only the outline. For any
finite l, let
plXKW (xK, w) = p
l
W (w)
∏
i∈K
plX|W (xi|w) ∈ P lXKW (12)
and pl
Y |XK
∈ PY |XK be the probability distributions that
achieve (7). Let
pW(w) =
∑
w∈Sw
plW (w), (13)
where
Sw =
{
w ∈ W : plX|W (x|w) = wx, x ∈ Q
}
, w ∈ W q,
(14)
then we can verify that the resulting pXKW satisfies
IpXKW,p
l
Y |XK
(XK;Y |W) = Ipl
XKW
,pl
Y |XK
(XK;Y |W ). (15)
(15) shows that for any plXKW defined in (12), we can find
a probability distribution in PXKW that achieves Clk,q . Thus
C′k,q ≥ Ck,q .
The proof of C′k,q ≤ Ck,q utilizes the continuity property of
mutual information, by which we can show that the sequence
〈Clk,q〉∞l=1 is lower bounded by a sequence converging to C′k,q .
Hence C′k,q = Ck,q .
Theorem 3.1 states the fingerprinting capacity as the
maxmin value of a two-person zero-sum game. Note that
since pX|W is actually fixed in the class of joint distributions
defined in (10), the maximizer only has control over pW,
which lies within the class of probability distributions over
W
q
, denoted by PW. Also, the payoff function I(XK;Y |W)
is a linear function of pW for fixed pY |XK and a convex
function of pY |XK for fixed pW. By the minimax theorem
[12], the game admits a saddle-point solution. In the game-
theoretic point of view, this is a so-called convex game [13,
§2.5]. The maximizer has an optimal mixed-strategy with a
finite support and the minimizer has an optimal unique pure-
strategy. Furthermore, the maxmin value equals the minmax
value of the same game restricting both players with pure
strategies. The following theorem states these properties.
Theorem 3.2:
Ck,q =
1
k
min
pY |XK∈PY |XK
max
w∈W q
I(XK;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
max
pW∈PW
min
pY |XK∈PY |XK
I(XK;Y |W). (16)
IV. CAPACITY FOR THE BINARY ALPHABET
We have established the existence of a saddle-point solution
for the capacity game. For the rest of the paper, we focus on
the binary alphabet case and see how the game can be solved.
A. Game Definition
We can simplify the game as follows:
1) Fingerprinting Code. Q = {0, 1}. The auxiliary random
vector W now has only one degree of freedom, and we
redefine it as W ∈ [0, 1]. pW denotes its distribution, and
WS the support of pW . pX|W ∼ Bernoulli(W ) is fixed.
2) Collusion Channel. Since pY |XK ∈ PY |XK defined
in (6) is invariant to permutations of K, it takes the
form pY |Z , where Z ,
∑k
i=1Xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} is
the number of 1’s in XK. Let p = (p0, . . . , pk)′, where
pz , pY |Z(1|z), z = 0, . . . , k. The marking assumption
enforces that p0 = 0 and pk = 1, and the collusion
channel is then completely characterized by p.
3) Capacity. If we let α(w) = (α0(w), . . . , αk(w))′, where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z (17)
is the binomial distribution with parameter w ∈ [0, 1],
then we have
Cˆ(w,p) , I(XK;Y |W = w)
= H(Y |W = w) −H(Y |XK,W = w)
= h2
(
k∑
z=0
pzαz(w)
)
−
k∑
z=0
h2(pz)αz(w)
= h2(α
′p)−α′h2(p). (18)
Another representation of Cˆ(w,p) is
Cˆ(w,p) = D(pY Z|W ‖pY |W pZ|W |W = w)
=
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d2(pz‖α′p) (19)
The fingerprinting capacity game for the binary alphabet
under the marking assumption can then be written as
Ck,2 =
1
k
max
pW
min
p
EpW
[
Cˆ(W,p)
]
(20)
=
1
k
min
p
max
w
Cˆ(w,p). (21)
B. Analysis of the Convex Game
Lemma 4.1: If p∗ is the minimizer in (20) and (21), then
p∗z = 1− p∗k−z , z = 0, . . . , k. (22)
Also, if p∗W is the maximizer of (20), then
p∗W (w) = p
∗
W (1 − w), ∀w ∈ [0, 1]. (23)
We skip the complete proof of Lemma 4.1 here but only
explain its idea. Note that p∗z represents the probability of
assigning Y as 1 when XK has z 1’s and (k − z) 0’s. By
symmetry we should expect in colluders’ capacity-achieving
strategy, the probability of assigning Y as 0 when XK has
(k − z) 1’s and z 0’s to also be p∗z , i.e., p∗k−z = 1 − p∗z, z =
0, . . . , k. Similarly, the capacity-achieving fingerprinting codes
should have the same distribution for 0 and 1, hence p∗W should
be symmetric as stated.
Owing to the existence of the saddle-point solution, p∗ and
p∗W must satisfy the following:
1) When p = p∗ is fixed, Cˆ(w,p∗) is a differentiable
function over the unit interval. The support of p∗W , W ∗S ,
can only take values at the maximizers of Cˆ(w,p∗).
Hence we have{
Cˆ(w,p∗) = kCk,2
∂
∂w
Cˆ(w,p∗) = 0
, ∀w ∈ W ∗S . (24)
2) When pW = p∗W is fixed, and if we only consider p that
satisfies (22), then we have
Ep∗
W
[
∂
∂pz
Cˆ(W,p∗)
]
= 0, z = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k − 1
2
⌋
.
(25)
By the convexity in p of the payoff function, we know that
|W ∗S | ≤
⌊
k+1
2
⌋ (see [13, §2.5]). With a fixed support cardinal-
ity, we can obtain candidate capacity-achieving distributions
p∗ and p∗W by solving (24) and (25), and then verify those
candidate distributions are optimal by examining the second
partial derivatives. Once p∗ and p∗W are found, we can get
Ck,2 by substituting them into (20).
C. Bounds on Capacity
For general k, the following two theorems gives us Ck,2 =
Θ(1/k2).
Theorem 4.2:
Ck,2 ≤ 1
k2 ln 2
=
1.443 . . .
k2
. (26)
Proof:
Consider the so-called “interleaving attack” p∞ defined by
p∞z =
z
k
, z = 0, . . . , k,
then we have
Ck,2 =
1
k
min
p
max
w
Cˆ(w,p)
≤ 1
k
max
w
Cˆ(w,p∞)
=
1
k
max
w
{
h2(w) −
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h2
( z
k
)}
≤ 1
k2 ln 2
, (27)
where the last inequality results from [10, Theorem 4.3].
Theorem 4.3:
Ck,2 ≥ 2
k2pi2 ln 2
=
0.292 . . .
k2
. (28)
Proof: Consider the continuous distribution
p∞W (w) =
1
pi
√
w(1 − w) , w ∈ (0, 1), (29)
then we have
Ck,2 =
1
k
max
pW
min
p
EpW
[
Cˆ(W,p)
]
≥ 1
k
min
p
Ep∞
W
[
Cˆ(W,p)
]
=
1
k
∫ 1
0
k∑
z=0
αz(w)d2(pz‖α′p)p∞W (w)dw
(a)
≥ 2
k ln 2
∫ 1
0
k∑
z=0
αz(w)(pz −α′p)2p∞W (w)dw
(b)
≥ 2
k ln 2
[∫ 1
0
∑k
z=0 f1(z, w)
1√
w(1−w)
p∞W (w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
∑k
z=0 f2(z, w)
1
w(1−w)p
∞
W (w)dw
(c)
=
2
k ln 2
[
1
pi
∫ 1
0
(∂α
∂w
)′pdw
]2
k
(d)
=
2
k2pi2 ln 2
,
where
f1(z, w) = αz(w)(pz −α′p)(z − kw)
and
f2(z, w) = αz(w)(z − kw)2.
(a) follows from Pinsker’s inequality [14, Lemma 11.6.1]. (b)
follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The numerator
of (c) follows from
k∑
z=0
f1(z, w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)(z − kw)pz
−α′pE [Z − kw|W = w]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= w(1 − w)(∂α
∂w
)′p,
while the denominator follows from
k∑
z=0
f2(z, w) = E
[
(Z − kw)2|W = w] = kw(1 − w).
Finally, (d) follows from the marking assumption: α′(0)p = 0
and α′(1)p = 1.
D. Asymptotic Behavior for Large Coalition
We solve the capacity games for small k’s using (24) and
(25) in Sec. IV-B. Fig. 1 shows the capacity along with the
upper and lower bounds. Amiri and Tardos [6] stated without
proof that Ck,2 & (k22 ln 2)−1. Our numerical results suggest
that this bound is tight and that the convergence is fairly quick.
Evaluating the convex game of (20) or (21) for large k
is still a difficult task. However, Theorem 4.2 and 4.3 shed
lights on the asymptotic behavior of the game. If a less
powerful coalition simply chooses the interleaving attack as
their strategy (a.k.a. “uniform channel” in [10] and “blind
colluders” in [5]), Theorem 4.2 shows that the gain in rate
is no more than a factor of two. In fact, one can show that
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Fig. 1. Capacity Ck,2 and upper and lower bounds
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Fig. 2. Difference p∗z − p∞z for k = 5, 10, and 37
Cˆ(w,p∞) ∼ (k2 ln 2)−1 for all w ∈ (0, 1) (based on results
from [15, §1.6]). Fig. 2 shows the difference between p∗ and
p∞ for different values of k. This suggests that the interleaving
attack is asymptotically optimal. This also answers Furon
et al.’s question in [5]: the fingerprinting code can only be
slightly shorter even against a naive coalition who performs
solely the interleaving attack.
An even bigger issue for the content distributor is that
the computation of the optimal p∗W is infeasible for large
k. Luckily, Theorem 4.3 resolves this predicament. By using
p∞W of (29), the loss in rate is only by a factor of about
2.5. Fig. 3 suggests, surprisingly, that p∗W converges to p∞W
in distribution. The same distribution was used in Tardos’
fingerprinting code in [3], which uses a simple decoder and is
designed to be independent of the collusion channel [5]. This
unifies the asymptotic distribution of p∗W for the simple and
joint decoders (see [9]: p∞W is asymptotically optimal.
We conclude with the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4.4: When k →∞, we have
Ck,2 ∼ (k22 ln 2)−1, (30)
p∗ ∼ p∞, (31)
and
p∗W → p∞W in distribution. (32)
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Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution function of p∞
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for k = 5, 10, and
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